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Abstract 
Purpose of this paper: This paper investigates associations between related party 
transactions (RPTs) and governance and performance factors of 
new economy firms.  
 
Approach: Previous research has examined the related party transactions 
of large U.S. firms. In contrast, we focus on smaller, newly 
listed Australian firms. Referred to as ‘commitments test 
entities’ (CTE), these firms are distinguished by the unique 
Australian Securities Exchange listing requirements applying to 
them, and associated additional (quarterly cash flow) reporting 
requirements. 
 
Findings: While strong corporate governance characteristics may be 
expected to constrain the amounts of payments and loans to 
related parties, we find only weak evidence to support that 
proposition. The results show that financial condition 
dominates the decision to engage in RPTs and suggest that 
external monitoring (associated both with larger firm size and 
the quarterly reporting phase) are a more effective restraint on 
the magnitude of RPTs for these high-risk CTE firms.  
 
Research implications: The findings are generally consistent with the ‘conflict of 
interest view’ proposed by Gordon et al. (2004a, 2004b), 
suggesting related party transactions do not serve shareholders’ 
interests. 
 
Practical implications: The findings suggest that external monitoring may be a more 
effective control over RPTs than internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in this institutional context of small ‘cashbox’ 
firms. Since RPTs may not be in the best interests of 
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shareholders, extending mandatory RPT disclosures to all 
periodic cash flow reports warrants further consideration by 
regulators. 
What is value of paper? This study contributes to the limited research on the effects and 
implications of related party transactions.  
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1. Introduction 
Global corporate scandals have focused regulators’ attention towards corporate governance as 
a means of improving accountability. Related party transactions (RPTs) have been linked to 
several of Australia’s largest corporate collapses (Institutional Analysis, 2002) and have 
recently become subject to scrutiny as part of approaches designed to improve governance 
standards. While accounting standards recognise that RPTs may have the potential to distort 
financial reports and should be properly disclosed, they have generally regarded these 
transactions as “a normal feature of commerce and business” (AASB 124, para. 5) and have 
not attempted to restrict or discourage them. However, stringent corporate governance 
measures introduced in the U.S. have now prohibited most related party loans between 
companies and their senior management.  
Recent empirical studies in the U.S. have examined RPTs within large firms to determine the 
nature and consequences of these transactions. Gordon et al. (2004b) and Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2004) have found that RPTs are associated with weaker corporate governance 
characteristics and poor market performance. They conclude that RPTs are a conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders rather than efficient, value-adding 
transactions. While these studies have investigated RPTs within large U.S. firms, no known 
studies of RPTs have yet been conducted in Australia or have examined smaller-sized firms. 
The objective of this study is to investigate factors associated with RPTs within a sample of 
smaller, newly listed companies in Australia. Referred to as ‘commitments test entities’ 
(CTEs), the firms examined are distinguished by the manner in which they have listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and the additional reporting requirements they must 
adhere to. CTEs are generally ‘new economy’ firms with developing businesses (ASX, 2002) 
and are not required to have a history of profitability. As a condition of their admission, the 
ASX requires them to provide the market with quarterly cash flow reports for at least the first 
eight quarters after listing. A unique feature of this quarterly report is the requirement to 
disclose cash outflows for related party payments and loans to directors and related entities. 
Analysing these transactions within CTEs allows this study some important distinctions from 
prior research and takes advantage of the unique prescribed format disclosures made within 
the quarterly cash flow report. 
Using a large sample of quarterly reports that include the majority of CTEs that listed 
between 2000 and 2005, we find support for the ‘conflict of interest view’ proposed by 
Gordon et al. (2004a), suggesting RPTs do not serve shareholders’ interests. Like Gordon et 
al. (2004b) and Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) in relation to large U.S. firms, we find that 
internal monitoring mechanisms in the form of independent directors constrain the amounts 
of RPTs within CTEs. However, other well-accepted indicators of good corporate governance 
used in prior research are not associated with RPTs.  Instead, external monitoring (associated 
both with larger firm size and the quarterly reporting phase) appears to be a more effective 
restraint on the magnitude of related party transactions (RPTs) within CTEs.  We also 
observe that a number of CTE performance factors (including return on assets) are negatively 
associated with RPTs which further supports the conflict interest argument rather than the 
efficient transactions argument.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a background on 
RPTs and reviews the prior literature. Section 3 describes CTEs and their reporting 
requirements. In Section 4 the factors expected to be associated with related party 
transactions are discussed. The research design is described in Section 5, with results of 
statistical tests and analyses presented in Section 6, followed by the conclusion in Section 7. 
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2. Related party transactions and prior research 
AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures defines RPTs as “a transfer of resources, services or 
obligations between related parties, regardless of whether a price is charged” (para. 9). 
Related parties include shareholders, directors, key management personnel, subsidiaries 
(and/or parent companies), and associates of these parties (AASB 124, para. 9). Gordon et al. 
(2004a, pp. 1-2) identify that RPTs are commonly “complex business transactions between a 
firm and its own managers, directors, principal owners or affiliates”. 
Australian, U.S. and international accounting standards require disclosure of RPTs as part of 
periodic reporting.1 These transactions are of primary concern because, by their nature, they 
may not be conducted on an arm’s-length basis and may not be based on normal commercial 
terms (AASB 124, para. 6). While RPTs may have the potential to distort a firm’s reported 
financial performance and position (and hence require closer scrutiny), they are nevertheless 
“a normal feature of commerce and business” as firms conduct business through subsidiaries, 
joint ventures and associates (AASB 124, para. 5). In addition to the disclosure requirements 
of accounting standards, RPTs have now become subject of closer regulatory scrutiny. 
In response to several large corporate collapses, the U.S. adopted prescriptive corporate 
governance rules with the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Despite being 
credited with quickly improving corporate governance standards in the U.S. (Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2007)2, this rules-based approach has been heavily criticised for the haste in 
which it was introduced and the high compliance costs it has imposed upon companies, 
particularly those that are smaller or developing (see for example, Romano, 2004; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2006).  
Australia has taken a different approach to improving governance, developing a ‘best 
practice’ framework rather than detailed rules (Hamilton, 2004, p. 4). The Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) introduced the ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance’ in 
2003, addressing issues such as board structure, financial reporting, ethics and remuneration 
policies. Although it is not mandatory for Australian listed entities to comply with these 
principles, they must provide reasons for any departure (ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3). The 
flexibility of this approach is favoured by market participants and supported by the OECD 
(Hamilton, 2004). 
The corporate governance regimes in Australia and the U.S. differ on the subject of RPTs. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation now prohibits most related party loans to executives and 
directors in the U.S., while in Australia there is no equivalent guidance. In fact, there is no 
reference to RPTs in the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance. The U.S. regulatory 
approach implies that RPTs (particularly those involving loans to management) are not in 
shareholders’ best interests and, therefore, should be prohibited. 
Empirical studies in the U.S. generally support the contention that RPTs conflict with 
shareholders’ interests. Gordon et al. (2004b) analysed the RPTs of 112 public companies in 
the U.S. in 2000 and 2001 (prior to the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley). They propose two 
alternative perspectives on the nature and effects of RPTs: (1) they are a conflict of interest 
between management and shareholders (and hence increase agency costs); and (2) RPTs are 
efficient transactions that fulfil a firm’s economic needs. Gordon et al. (2004b) find that 
                                                 
1 AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures is the Australian equivalent to the international accounting standard, 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures. The relevant U.S. accounting standard is FASB Statement No. 57 Related 
Party Disclosures. 
2  See also ‘US companies rise to top of corporate governance table’, Financial Times, 7/9/04, page 23.  
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related party transactions are widespread, but are less common in firms with stronger 
corporate governance characteristics. They also identify a negative relation between firms’ 
market performance and the number and magnitude of related party transactions. This 
association is particularly strong in the case of related party loans, lending support to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibition. Overall, they conclude that the conflict of interest hypothesis 
holds and that RPTs generally, and loans to executives in particular, represent a conflict of 
interest that are detrimental to shareholders’ interests. 
Similar to Gordon et al. (2004b), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) examined whether the RPTs 
of 1,261 US companies in the S&P 1500 Index are an agency cost, or a method of efficient 
contracting. They also find that RPTs are associated with a lower returns on assets and 
weaker corporate governance. Moreover, where cash-based remuneration of directors and 
executives is low (for example, where share options are issued in place of higher cash 
salaries), related party loans are more frequent. Related party loans may therefore be used as 
a substitute form of compensation for less liquid remuneration. Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004, 
p.6) show that RPTs “are more likely to occur when management has the ability and the 
incentives to engage in them” and hence, impose agency costs on shareholders.  
 
3.  Related party disclosures in CTE quarterly cash flow reports  
The limited prior research on related party transactions has focused on the impact of RPTs on 
large companies in the U.S. This study builds on that literature by analysing such transactions 
with respect to a subset of smaller, newly-listed companies in Australia where the potential 
for value-destroying RPTs is greater than for most other listed entities. Referred to as 
‘commitments test entities’ (CTEs), these firms are distinguished from other ASX-listed 
companies by different admission rules under which they listed, and additional special 
reporting requirements. 
In 1999, the ASX relaxed its admission rules3 to allow entities holding more than fifty per 
cent of their tangible assets in cash (or equivalents) to list, providing they make 
‘commitments’ to eventually reduce this proportion to less than half. This concession 
“facilitated the admission of smaller entities with developing businesses based on new 
technology or other intellectual property assets” (ASX, 2002, p. 2). The general profitability 
requirement which applies to other entities previously prevented many of these firms from 
listing (Fargher and Woo, 2002). The ASX draws parallels between such new and emerging 
companies to mining exploration companies (ASX, 2002), presumably because of higher 
risks and governance concerns associated with CTEs (Gallery, Gallery and Sidhu, 2004). 
Unlike the U.S. and the U.K., Australia does not have a separate exchange for smaller, 
developing companies.4 Nor does the ASX distinguish CTEs from all other listed entities by 
separate categorisation, or other means of clearly ‘flagging’ they are entities that were 
admitted under ‘special’ rules and are subject to additional ASX reporting requirements. 
Klein and Mohanram (2005) show that firms entering the market via less stringent NASDAQ 
listing rules (particularly when a history of profitability is not required) are generally poor-
performing and more risky. Parallels can be drawn between the changes to the NASDAQ 
listing rules in the U.S. in the late 1990s and amendments made to the ASX listing rules to 
admit CTEs. Both the NASDAQ and the ASX experienced a surge in new listings coinciding 
with the ‘dot-com boom’ and the changes made to their admission rules. A significant 
                                                 
3 In particular, ASX Listing Rule 1.3.2(b).  
4 For example, NASDAQ in the U.S. and AIM in the U.K. both cater for smaller listings than the New York 
Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, respectively. 
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proportion of these companies would not have been permitted to list under the earlier, more 
conservative rules (Fargher and Woo, 2002; Klein and Mohanram, 2005).  
As a condition of their admission, CTEs are required to provide quarterly cash flow (QCF) 
reports to the ASX for at least the first eight quarters after listing (ASX Listing Rule 4.7B). 
This additional reporting requirement was introduced because established periodic reporting 
is considered to be insufficiently frequent to meet the market’s information needs (ASX, 
2002) and it is intended to mitigate the increased risks to investors exposed to these entities. 
Apart from mining exploration companies, CTEs are the only entities in Australia that must 
provide any form of quarterly reports as part of their routine periodic reporting regime.  
The format of QCF reports is prescribed by Appendix 4C of the ASX Listing Rules, and 
comprises a pro-forma cash flow statement with some limited ‘note’ disclosures. This report, 
which is not required to be audited or reviewed by the auditor, must be lodged within one 
month of the end of the relevant quarter. CTEs must continue to lodge QCF reports until the 
ASX determines that they have reached “sufficient maturity”, which is usually signalled by 
four consecutive quarters of positive cash flows from operations (ASX, 2002). 
The content of the 4C quarterly cash flow report differs in a number of ways from the 
requirements of AASB 107 Cash Flow Statements5, which prescribes the content of cash 
flow statements in annual financial reports. First, although the general categories of cash 
flows are the same (i.e., cash flows from operating, investing and financing activities), the 
items within those categories are generally more detailed in the 4C report. For example, 
where AASB 107 requires just an aggregated amount for payments to suppliers and 
employees, the 4C Report requires separate line items showing payments for staff costs, 
advertising and marketing, research and development, leased assets and other working capital 
payments. Second, because there are no quarterly income statements accompanying the 
quarterly cash flow reports, there is no reconciliation of operating cash flows and profit that is 
otherwise required in annual financial reports under AASB 107 (para. Aus20.1). Finally, the 
4C report stipulates other ‘supplementary’ disclosures that are not required by AASB 107, 
including cash outflows to certain related parties. 6
The related party transactions that must be disclosed in the 4C Report relate to cash payments 
to “directors of the entity and associates of the directors” and “related entities of the entity 
and associates of the related entities”. Two types of disclosures are required: (1) payments to 
related parties that are included as payments to employees and suppliers in cash flows from 
operations; and (2) loans to related parties included in investing cash flows. However the 
implied definition of related parties in the 4C Report is somewhat narrower than that in 
AASB 124, encompassing directors and related entities but not senior executives or other key 
management personnel.7 The ASX Listing Rules and Guidance Notes do not provide a 
rationale for requiring these unique disclosures, but it would seem that their purpose is to give 
an indication of the governance environment of the reporting entity during the early start-up 
stage when cash burn is significant and the potential for cash mismanagement is high. These 
quarterly disclosure requirements provide us with a unique opportunity to examine factors 
associated with the usage of RPTs in smaller, recently listed entities. 
 
                                                 
5 AASB 107 Cash Flow Statements is equivalent to the international accounting standard, IAS 7 Cash Flow 
Statements.  
6 Other required disclosures are details of non-cash financing and investing activities, and a description of 
acquisitions and disposals of business entities.  
7 This difference makes it difficult to reconcile the related party disclosures in 4C Reports and the disclosures 
made in annual financial reports. 
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4. Factors associated with related party transactions in CTEs 
 
The conflict of interest hypothesis posits that RPTs are a form of agency costs where agents 
(managers and directors) exploit RPTs for their own private gain at the expense of 
shareholders’ interests, and accordingly, RPTs are value-destroying. The alternative 
hypothesis is that RPTs are efficient transactions that fulfil a firm’s economic needs, for 
example, where they take advantage of the superior knowledge and skills of related parties 
and/or involve a price advantage for the firm. According to this hypothesis, RPTs are benign 
or potentially value-enhancing. (Gordon et al., 2004a, 2004b; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004) 
If the conflict of interest hypothesis is the dominating hypothesis, then mechanisms that 
reduce agency costs such as effective internal and external monitoring mechanisms and 
measures of firm performance are likely to be negatively associated with the usage of RPTs. 
In contrast, if the efficient transaction hypothesis is the dominant hypothesis, then internal 
and external monitoring mechanisms and measures of firm performance are likely to be 
positively associated with the usage of RPTs.     
Prior U.S. research generally finds support for the conflict of interest hypothesis. We 
therefore base our expectations on this hypothesis in the following discussion of internal and 
external monitoring and firm performance factors. Findings opposite to our expectations are 
likely to support the efficient transactions hypothesis.  
4.1 Internal monitoring mechanisms and related party transactions 
Of the numerous governance mechanism examined in prior research, three internal 
governance factors are particularly relevant in the governance of CTEs: (1) proportion of 
independent members on the board of directors; (2) the presence of an independent chairman; 
and (3) the presence of an audit committee.  
Prior research has extensively investigated the composition of the board of directors and the 
significance of independence as a governance mechanism.  The ASX’s Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance recommend that a majority of the board should be comprised of 
independent directors (Recommendation 2.1). Independent boards have been found to be 
more effective monitors of the financial reporting process and increasing the credibility of 
published results (Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 
1990). Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) and Davidson et al. (2005) also find that boards 
dominated by management (i.e., less independent) are associated with instances of earnings 
management.  
Gordon et al. (2004b, p.10)) argue that the monitoring function for RPTs “naturally falls 
under the board’s responsibilities”. Consistent with this claim, they find evidence of a 
positive association between the amount of related party payments to executives and the 
proportion of executive directors on the governing board, suggesting that, consistent with the 
conflict of interest hypothesis, firms with more independent boards have smaller amounts of 
RPTs.  We similarly expect that higher proportions of independent directors on CTE boards 
will mitigate the amounts paid to related parties, and without such a constraint, the RPT 
amounts will be higher.  
The presence of an independent chairman of the board of directors is another key internal 
monitoring mechanism and is indicative of good corporate governance. Prior studies have 
shown that when the roles of chairman and chief executive are segregated, internal control is 
stronger and the board performs its key functions (such as evaluating the chief executive’s 
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performance) more effectively (Jensen, 1993). Indeed, Goyal and Park (2002) find that a dual 
chairman/chief executive role weakens the board’s monitoring function. Gordon et al. 
(2004b) find that firms with a chairman who is also the chief executive officer have relatively 
more RPTs. Likewise we expect that the amounts of RPTs would be minimised in CTEs with 
an independent chairman of the board. 
An audit committee is seen as an efficient device for monitoring of the integrity of financial 
reporting (ASX, 2003, p. 29). While the ASX’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
recommend that all companies establish an audit committee, only the top 500 companies in 
Australia are under obligation to do so (Recommendation 4.2; ASX Listing Rule 12.7). The 
earnings management literature suggests that the absence of an audit committee is associated 
with more opportunistic behaviour (Dechow et al., 1996); however, the overall effectiveness 
of the committee (in preventing earnings manipulation) is a function of its independence and 
meeting frequency (Davidson et al., 2005; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003). With respect to 
RPTs, Gordon et al. (2004b) note that some firms require independent members of the audit 
committee to approve RPTs.  If a firm does not have an audit committee then such 
monitoring cannot occur. 8  Hence, assuming that audit committees are effective (on average), 
we expect that the presence of an audit committee will provide a higher level of scrutiny over 
RPTs, thereby minimising the amounts of such transactions. 
 
4.2 External monitoring mechanisms and related party transactions  
Common external mechanisms shown to induce positive behavioural outcomes include the 
engagement of a high quality auditor, and monitoring by creditors, information and financial 
intermediaries, and the media (Gillan, 2006).  
With respect to the monitoring role of auditors, DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger audit 
firms are responsible for better quality audits because they have fewer incentives to behave 
opportunistically and more concern for their broader reputation. Audits by larger firms have 
been found to exhibit a higher earnings response coefficient, suggesting a higher level of 
credibility (Teoh and Wong, 1993). Consistent with Willenborg (1999), Ferguson and 
Matolcsy (2003) suggest that the benefits of audit quality may be more pronounced in smaller 
companies because of the greater likelihood of information asymmetry. We expect that audit 
quality, as an effective monitoring mechanism, will constrain the amounts of RPTs within 
CTEs. 
Apart from external auditors, the individual influence on CTEs of other external monitors is 
difficult to measure as few CTEs are followed by financial analysts, creditors are rare due to 
low levels of debt among CTEs, and most institutional investors do not have substantial 
shareholdings in CTEs. As an alternative we use firm size as a proxy for these other external 
monitoring factors. Consistent with the arguments of Gordon et al. (2004b) and Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew (2004) with respect to external monitors, we expect that the external scrutiny of 
larger firms constrains both the incidence and magnitude of RPTs. Similarly, we expect that 
companies in the ASX top 500 are likely to be subject to greater external scrutiny and 
therefore limit their RPTs. 
As another proxy for external monitoring, we use the 4C reporting history. The reporting 
history is of particular interest because CTEs are likely to be under greatest scrutiny during 
the first eight quarters (the mandatory initial reporting period) and could be expected to be 
                                                 
8 Many CTEs fall outside the top 500 companies by market capitalisation. They are therefore not required to 
have an audit committee (ASX Listing Rule 12.7).   
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striving to achieve positive operating cash flows so that the ASX permits them to cease 
quarterly cash flow reporting. As such, they would generally be more conscious of cash 
outflows in the first eight quarters and therefore seek to minimise RPTs during that period.  
 
4.3 Financial performance and related party transactions  
Gordon et al. (2004b), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) find a negative association between 
various market measures of performance and RPTs, which they argue supports the conflict of 
interest hypothesis. Similarly we expect that performance-related factors relevant to CTEs 
will be negatively associated with RPTs usage.  We use four measures of firm performance:  
return on assets (ROA), research and development (R&D) expenditure, financial slack and 
the CTE reporting threshold test.   
We select ROA as our first measure of firm performance because it is a common measure of 
financial performance and it is not as volatile as market measures of CTE performance. 
Research and development (R&D) expenditure is used as our second measure of firm 
performance because many CTEs have large expenditure on R&D activities. As an indicator 
of firm performance, R&D expenditure has been found to generate excess returns, and is 
associated with higher market value (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok and 
Sougiannis, 2001; Asthana and Zhang, 2006). RPTs may restrict the funds available to 
undertake beneficial R&D activities.  
The financial slack available to CTEs may also affect the amount of RPTs. High cash 
balances and unused financing facilities may induce managers to act for their private gain 
rather than in the best interests of shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Myers and 
Rajan, 1998). Another important consideration is the amount spent on operating and investing 
items after RPTs in terms of whether RPTs are a substitute for other outflows, or whether the 
magnitude of these transactions is independently determined. 
Whether firms have ceased Appendix 4C reporting and the reasons for doing so provides a 
further indicator of performance. CTEs that have ceased reporting because they have met the 
ASX’s threshold requirement of four consecutive quarterly cash flow reports with positive 
operating cash flows signals that these firm has been successful in consistently producing 
positive cash flows from operations. In contrast, CTEs that continue to produce negative 
operating cash flows or which have ceased reporting because of suspension or delisting can 
be consider as unsuccessful firms.  
 
5. Research design 
5.1 Sample and data sources 
The sample used in this study is based on the dataset of Gallery et al. (2004). This database 
contains the population of quarterly cash flow reports issued by firms subject to 4C Reporting 
since Listing Rule 4.7B was introduced on 31 March 2000. In total, Gallery et al. (2004) 
identify 331 companies that have lodged Appendix 4C quarterly cash flow reports between 
March 2000 and December 2003. That database has been extended to December 2005 and 
this study draws on that extended dataset.  
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In selecting the sample, firms which were 4C reporting but are not technically CTEs (i.e. not 
admitted under Listing Rule 1.3.2(a) or (b)) were eliminated.9 Firms for which there are one 
or more missing 4C reports in the firm’s reporting sequence are also excluded. In the tests we 
control for whether the firm has successfully reached the minimum eight-quarter threshold 
and ceased 4C-reporting, and accordingly eliminate firms that have reported for fewer than 
eight quarters. The final sample comprises 224 CTEs that have lodged a total of 3827 QCF 
reports between March 2000 and December 2005.  
All quarterly cash flow data used in testing were obtained from the Appendix 4C Reports of 
the Gallery et al. (2004) and extended database. Related party payments and related party 
loans are disclosed in the 4C Report at Items 1.24 and 1.25, respectively. The governance 
characteristics (board independence, auditor, audit committee and chairman) were sourced 
from each firm’s annual financial report, obtained through Aspect Huntley’s FinAnalysis 
database. FinAnalysis was also used to obtain half and full-year financial reports from which 
data on assets and income were sourced. Market data (including market capitalisation and 
market capitalisation rank) were drawn from the Share Price and Price Relatives (SPPR) 
database maintained by the Centre for Research in Finance, University of New South Wales. 
 
5.2 Regression Models  
To test associations between related party transactions and the factors identified in Section 4, 
two regression models are estimated, with related party payments (RPP) entering the first 
model and related party loans (RPL) entering the second model.  
Regression Model 1 is specified as:  
itititititititit
ititititititit
ORIGUCC8SCFOOFINSLACKRDROAQTR
TOPMCAPAUDAUDCCHAIRINDIRRPP
εααααααα
ααααααα
++++++++
++++++=
13121110987
6543210
8
500  
   (1) 
The dependent variable RPP is the dollar amount of related party payments that is included in 
operating cash flow payments to staff and suppliers. RPP is measured as related party 
payments for the quarter deflated by average total assets for the relevant half year. Average 
total assets is calculated using the relevant half-year balances as this information is not 
disclosed quarterly.  
The three internal monitoring variables are: INDIR measured as the proportion of non-
executive (independent) directors on the board;  CHAIR coded one (1) where the chairman of 
the board is a non-executive director (independent) and zero (0) otherwise; and AUDC coded 
one (1) where the firm has an audit committee and zero (0) otherwise.  
The next set of variables represent the external monitoring factors. AUD is coded one (1) 
where a Big-4 auditor is engaged  and zero (0) otherwise. MCAP proxies for firm size and is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation on the last trading day of the 
relevant quarter. Firm size can be measured by total assets, total sales or market capitalisation 
(Foster, 1986). Because CTEs are generally developing companies with no history of 
profitability, a sales measure is difficult to interpret. Measuring the size of CTEs by total 
                                                 
9 Under Listing Rule 4.7B(d), the ASX has discretion, on a case by case basis, to require non-CTE firms to 
lodge 4C QCF reports “where quarterly reporting is considered to be warranted to supplement the entity’s 
continuous disclosure in relation [to] its financial position” (ASX, 2002, p. 4). This requirement is principally to 
facilitate close monitoring of firms that are encountering operating issues such as liquidity problems.  
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assets is problematic because this information is only available half-yearly whereas RPT 
disclosures are made quarterly. Market capitalisation is therefore considered to be the best 
proxy for size for this sample of firms. TOP500 represents whether the CTE was in the top 
500 of ASX-listed firms, as measured by market capitalisation at the end of the relevant 
quarter, with firms in the top 500 coded one (1), otherwise zero (0).  QTR8 indicates the 
reporting phase and is coded zero (0) if the QCF report is in the first eight quarters of the 
firm’s reporting sequence, and one (1) otherwise.  
 The final set of test variables are the performance-related factors. ROA is return on assets 
and is measured as net profit for the relevant half-year divided by average total assets. RD 
measures cash outflows relating to research and development expenditures and is deflated by 
average total assets. FINSLACK is the sum of ending cash balance and unused financing 
facilities for each quarter, deflated by average total assets. CFOO is spending on items other 
than related party payments, and is measured as total operating cash outflows less related 
party payments, deflated by average total assets. SUCC is coded one (1) where a firm has met 
the ASX’s threshold of four consecutive quarters of positive operating cash flows, or has 
otherwise been permitted to cease 4C reporting (quarterly cash flows) by the ASX, and zero 
(0) otherwise.  
Finally, whether a company originally listed as a CTE (i.e. an IPO), or was previously listed 
and has converted to a CTE10 may also be associated with RPTs. There may be differences in 
the corporate governance and economic characteristics of these firms, and in turn, the amount 
of RPTs entered into. ORIG is therefore included as a control variable and is coded one (1) 
where firms were already ASX-listed and then changed their activities and were readmitted 
as CTEs; firms that are coded zero (0) are those originally listed as CTEs.  
In regression Model 2 the dependent variable is loans to related parties (RPL). 
itititititititit
ititititititit
ORIGUCC8SCFIOFINSLACKRDROAQTR
TOPMCAPAUDAUDCCHAIRINDIRRPL
εααααααα
ααααααα
++++++++
++++++=
13121110987
6543210
8
500  
  (2) 
 
RPL is measured as loans to related parties, deflated by average total assets. The independent 
variables are the same as for Model 1, except for CFIO, which is cash expenditures on 
investing activities, other than loans to related parties.  
Pooled cross-sectional time-series data can potentially be serially correlated, which would 
violate the independent observations assumption of regression analysis (Greene, 2000). 
Lagrange Multiplier Tests confirmed that the classical regression model should not be used 
and therefore a random effects model is employed in regression analyses. Also, the two 
dependent variables are censored in that significant proportions of the observations have no 
related party payments or loans, and thus have a value of zero.11 “Conventional regression 
methods fail to account for the qualitative difference between limit (zero) observations and 
nonlimit (continuous) observations” (Greene, 2000, p.906). Accordingly, the Tobit model is 
applied in the regression analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
10 If a listed entity makes a significant change to the nature or scale of its activities the ASX has the discretion, 
under Listing Rule 11.1.3, to treat it as if it were ‘reapplying’ for admission. This would include the application 
of Listing Rule 1.3.2(b), which relates to entities with more than half of their tangible assets in cash (CTEs). 
11 Of the total observations, 355 (9.3%) in Model 1 and 3710 (88.9%) in Model 2, have a value of zero.  
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6. Results 
The distribution of sample firms across the 24-quarter study period is presented in Table 1. 
The number of new CTEs was highest in March 2000 with 59 firms listing, however this 
steadily declined to zero new firms listing in September 2003. Numbers have since increased 
however, with 104 CTEs listing between March 2004 and December 2005 (untabulated). 
Interestingly, of the 59 CTEs that began reporting in March 2000, 30 were continuing to 
report as at December 2005, which is well beyond the initial eight-quarter monitoring period.  
[TABLE 1 HERE]  
Table 2 provides a distribution of sample firms by the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS). Health care (24.1 per cent) and information technology (28.1 per cent) are 
the dominant sectors, representing just over half of all of the firms examined. This is 
consistent with the ‘new economy’ activities of many of the CTEs. 
[TABLE 2 HERE]  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the raw data and Table 4 presents the deflated 
variables used in statistical testing.12  Table 3, Panel A shows that the mean (median) market 
capitalisation of CTEs is $31.6 million ($9.2 million), indicating that CTEs are generally 
smaller firms. However 72 companies (8.04 per cent) were in the ASX top 500 companies for 
at least one quarter (Table 4, Panel B).  
[TABLES 3 & 4 HERE]  
The frequencies shown in Panel B of Table 3 indicate that related party payments (RPPs) are 
ubiquitous with almost all firms (99.1 per cent) reporting such payments in at least one 
quarter, with a mean (median) value of $149,000 ($89,000). Related party loans are less 
common, although still reasonably widespread, with 53 companies (23.7 per cent) disclosing 
such loans; the median value is $52,000.  
The descriptive statistics for the internal monitoring factors in Table 4 show that, on average, 
the boards of CTEs are independent with a mean proportion of 57.5 per cent of non-executive 
directors, most of the CTEs (59.8 per cent) have an audit committee and two-thirds have an 
independent chairman. For the external monitoring factors, the statistics show that fewer than 
half of the CTEs (41.5 per cent) engage a Big-4 auditor, perhaps reflecting the high 
proportion of smaller firms, which are likely to fall outside the Big-4 firms’ target client base.  
In relation to performance factors, the statistics reveal generally poor profitability among 
CTEs with mean (median) negative 20 per cent (negative 13 per cent) return on assets. Only 
46 of the 224 CTEs (20.5 per cent) achieved the ASX’s threshold to cease 4C reporting, 
indicating that CTEs generally struggle to generate positive operating cash flows. The 
difficulty of meeting this threshold is further demonstrated by each firm, on average, lodging 
17 quarterly cash flow reports, which is well beyond the minimum eight-quarter reporting 
period.  
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of variables included in regression tests, with Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficients and p-values shown above (below) the diagonal. There 
                                                 
12 Extreme observations were winsorised by no more than five percent of the total sample (see Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). 
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are no significantly high correlations among the independent variables, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be a threat to the interpretation of the subsequent analysis. 
[TABLE 5 HERE]  
 
6.2 Regression results 
The results of multivariate tests are shown in Table 6.13 Regression Model (1) tests for 
associations between related party payments (RPPs) and internal and external monitoring 
factors, and firm performance factors. For the internal monitoring factors, the significant 
negative coefficient for INDIR (t = 1.79, p < 0.05) suggests that the higher the proportion of 
independent directors on the board, the smaller the amounts of payments to related parties. 
Thus it would appear that non-executive directors constrain payments to related parties. None 
of the coefficients for the other two internal monitoring factors (the presence of an audit 
committee and independent chairman) is significant. Thus, these other commonly accepted 
indicators of good governance practices do not appear to constrain RPPs in CTEs.  
[TABLE 6 HERE]  
For the external monitoring factors, the results in Table 6 reveal that auditor quality (AUD) 
has no significant influence on the RPTs. However, larger firms have relatively smaller 
amounts of RPPs, with the coefficient for MCAP negative and significant (t = -7.97, p < 
0.01). This result is consistent with larger firms being subject to greater external monitoring 
through their increased scrutiny by analysts, institutional investors, creditors and the media. 
The coefficient for QTR8 is also positive and significant (t = 4.27, p < 0.01), indicating that 
firms spent smaller amounts on RPPs in the first eight quarters of 4C reporting. During the 
initial mandatory reporting period there is likely to be greater ASX and other external 
scrutiny over the quarterly cash flow reports, and firms are likely to be striving to achieve the 
positive operating cash flows to be allowed to cease reporting. In contrast, firms that have 
failed to meet this target during the first eight quarters subsequently spend greater amounts on 
RPPs in periods beyond the initial eight quarters.  
With respect to the performance factors, the Table 6 results show that, contrary to 
expectations, the coefficients for CFOO (t = 5.22, p < 0.01) and RD (t = 5.07, p < 0.01) are 
significantly positive, implying that CTEs with higher amounts of payments to related parties 
also spend higher amounts on other operating activities and research and development. This 
finding is consistent with the efficient transaction hypothesis in that RPPs could be 
interpreted as being part of legitimate cash outflows for productive activities. However, 
results for most other performance variables provide support for the conflict of interest 
hypothesis. The coefficient for ROA (t = -8.22, p < 0.01) indicates that firms with low 
profitability have greater amounts of RPPs.  CTEs with greater holdings of cash and access to 
financing facilities (FINSLACK) have larger amounts of RPPs (t = 9.41, p < 0.01). This could 
be of concern given that CTEs, by their nature, have considerable cash assets.  
A further indicator of firm performance for this sample of CTEs is whether the firm achieved 
four consecutive quarters of positive cash flows from operations and the ASX permitted the 
firm to cease quarterly cash flow (4C) reporting. The significant negative coefficient for 
SUCC (t = -1.76, p < 0.05) shows those firms that were successful in reaching the ASX’s 
threshold to cease 4C reporting had smaller amounts of related party payments. Consistent 
with the findings of Gordon et al. (2004b) and Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004), these results 
                                                 
13 Unadjusted t-statistics are reported, as results of White’s (1980) test indicate the regression results are not 
affected by heteroscedasticity.  
 14
provide further evidence that poorer performing firms have greater amounts of RPPs and that 
such transactions are a conflict of interest rather than efficient, value-adding transactions.  
Regression Model (2) tests for associations between related party loans (RPL) and the same 
factors tested in Model (1), except the cash investing outflows variable (CFIO) replaces the 
operating cash outflows variable (CFOO). Results presented in Table 6 show that none of 
internal monitoring factors and only one of the external governance factors (TOP500) is 
significant in the expected direction. While the negative coefficient for TOP500 (t = -1.71, p 
< 0.05) indicates that firms under greater scrutiny by analysts and the media are less likely to 
have related party loans, a similar result is not evident for CTEs in their first eight reporting 
quarters (QTR8). With respect to the performance variables, the negative coefficient for RD (t 
= -2.78, p < 0.01) implies that in the presence of related party loans, CTEs spend less on 
research and development activities, possibly forgoing opportunities that could generate 
positive cash flows in the future.  Interestingly, the coefficient for FINSLACK is significantly 
negative (t = -2.48, p < 0.05), indicating that firms with related party loans have lower cash 
reserves and other financing facilities available to them; thus related party loans have a 
negative impact on the firm’s cash position. Generally the results for related party loans are 
consistent but weaker than those reported for related party payments. The small number of 
firms with related party loans and the small amounts associated with each transactions have 
possibly contributed to the weaker findings for these transactions relative to related paper 
payments.   
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates associations between related party transactions and three set of factors 
found to be associated with related party transactions in prior literature:  internal and external 
corporate monitoring mechanisms, and firm performance. While previous research has 
examined the RPTs of large U.S. companies, our study focuses on smaller, newly listed 
Australian companies. The general characteristics of these firms, and their unique reporting 
requirements, provide an interesting setting in which to examine factors associated with 
RPTs. 
Quarterly cash flow reports of 224 smaller, new economy companies over the 24 quarters 
between March 2000 and December 2005 (comprising a total of 3827 observations) were 
examined. It was expected that strong internal and external monitoring mechanisms would 
constrain the amounts of payments and loans to related parties.  
Overall, our findings indicate that, apart from board independence, other well-accepted 
indicators of good internal corporate governance do not constrain the amounts of related 
party transactions within the population of CTEs. Instead, external monitoring mechanisms 
are found to be the more important influences. Greater external monitoring, associated both 
with larger firm size and the initial eight-quarter reporting period, appears to be a most 
effective restraint on the magnitude of related party transactions within CTEs. Furthermore, 
the findings of associations between greater amounts of RPTs and lower returns on assets and 
failure to achieve positive operating cash flows necessary to be permitted to cease quarterly 
cash flow reporting, demonstrates that RPTs are associated with poor performance. These 
findings are generally support the conclusion of Gordon et al. (2004b) and Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2004) that RPTs are not economically efficient and conflict with shareholders’ 
interests.  
These findings have a number of important implications for both regulators and market 
participants. First, the general absence of associations with factors that are widely accepted as 
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indicative of good internal governance suggests that such governance characteristics are not 
effective in constraining related party transactions in the context of smaller, cashbox 
companies. Our results suggest that external monitoring may be a more effective control over 
RPTs than internal corporate governance mechanisms in this institutional context. Second, 
the significance of firm performance variables implies that the financial condition of a firm 
dominates the decision to engage in RPTs for smaller, high risk firms like CTEs. Finally, the 
requirement that commitments test entities disclose related party transactions as line items in 
quarterly cash flow reports represents relevant information for users to monitor transactions 
that may not be in the best interests of shareholders. Extending such disclosures to all 
periodic cash flow reports warrants further consideration by regulators.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of test sample CTE firm-quarter observations by report number and quarterly date 
 
Quarter Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Report No. Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Total
00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 02 02 02 02 03 03 03 03 04 04 04 04 05 05 05 05
1 59 33 25 19 20 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 224
2 59 33 25 19 20 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 224
3 59 33 25 19 20 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 224
4 59 33 25 19 20 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 224
5 59 33 25 19 20 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 224
6 59 33 25 19 20 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 224
7 59 33 25 19 19 6 13 7 7 13 2 5 3 2 0 10 223
8 59 33 25 19 19 6 13 7 7 13 2 3 3 2 0 10 221
9 54 33 23 19 17 6 12 7 7 11 2 3 1 2 0 10 207
10 53 31 22 18 17 6 12 6 7 10 1 2 1 2 0 188
11 52 28 21 16 17 6 12 6 7 10 1 2 1 2 181
12 52 27 20 15 16 6 12 6 7 9 1 2 1 174
13 49 27 20 14 16 5 12 6 7 9 1 2 168
14 46 25 19 14 16 5 12 6 7 8 1 159
15 42 25 18 14 14 5 12 6 7 8 151
16 39 25 16 13 12 5 12 6 7 135
17 39 25 16 12 12 5 12 6 127
18 38 24 15 12 12 5 12 118
19 37 25 15 12 12 5 106
20 35 23 14 12 12 96
21 33 22 14 12 81
22 31 22 14 67
23 31 20 51
24 30 30
Total 59 92 117 136 156 162 175 182 184 196 192 193 188 184 176 180 178 172 164 158 150 146 145 142 3827
 
 
Note: Shaded cells represent observations for firms with less than eight quarterly cash flow reports which have been omitted from the analysis.
Table 2
Distribution of sample firms by industry
GICS* industry classification
n % n %
Consumer Discretionary 531 13.9 30 13.4
Consumer Staples 93 2.4 6 2.7
Financials 365 9.5 25 11.2
Health Care 937 24.5 54 24.1
Industrials 348 9.1 22 9.8
Information Technology 1157 30.2 63 28.1
Materials 116 3.0 8 3.6
Telecommunications Services 201 5.3 11 4.9
Utilities 79 2.1 5 2.2
Total 3827 100.0 224 100.0
* Global Industry Classification Standard
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for sample firms
Panel A: All firm-year observations Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
n $000 $000 $000 $000 $000
Related party payments 3827 136 82 484 0 19,957
 – for firms with related party payments 3480 149 89 505 1 19,957
Related party loans 3827 89 0 4,703 0 290,164
 – for firms with related party loans 119 2,858 52 26,630 4 290,164
Related party transactions 3827 224 83 4,725 0 290,164
 – for firms with related party transactions 3495 246 90 4,944 1 290,164
Market capitalisation 3827 31,612 9,166 129,629 106 4,058,218
Total assets 3827 23,491 8,974 115,882 13 3,607,628
Financial slack 3827 5,854 2,072 22,243 -3,775 597,445
Research and development outflows 3827 174 0 927 0 34,935
Half-year profit 3827 -2,415 -877 16,642 -485,985 345,248
Number of 4C Reports per firm 224   17   18   5   8   24
Panel B: Frequencies of related party transactions 
n  = 224 n % n %
Related party payments 2 0.9 222 99.1
Related party loans 171 76.3 53 23.7
Related party transactions 1 0.4 223 99.6
Firms
0 1
Quarterly observations
 Table 4        
Test variables        
Panel A: Continuous variables n = 3827   Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
        
RPP   0.0156 0.0087 0.0197 0.0000 0.1000 
RPL   0.0006 0.0000 0.0060 -0.0007 0.1000 
INDIR   0.5745 0.6000 0.1936 0.0000 1.0000 
MCAP   9.2295 9.1200 1.3181 4.6600 15.2200 
ROA   -0.2003 -0.1302 0.2709 -1.0000 0.5000 
RD   0.0135 0.0000 0.0385 0.0000 0.5000 
FINSLACK   0.3954 0.3079 0.3347 0.0000 1.5000 
CFOO   0.2212 0.1464 0.2264 0.0000 1.0000 
CFIO   0.0354 0.0067 0.0902 0.0000 1.0000 
        
Panel B: Dichotomous variables n = 224   Frequencies 
   0  1 
   n %  n % 
CHAIR   72 32.1  152 67.9 
AUDC   90 40.2  134 59.8 
AUD   131 58.5  93 41.5 
TOP500   199 88.8  25 11.2 
SUCC   178 79.5  46 20.5 
ORIG   160 71.4  64 28.6 
                
 
RPP is related party payments in the quarter deflated by average total assets†; RPL is related party loans deflated 
by average total assets; INDIR is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of each firm; MCAP is 
the natural logarithm of market capitalisation measured at the last trading day of the relevant quarter; ROA is the 
net profit for the relevant half-year divided by average total assets; RD is cash outflows relating to research and 
development expenditure deflated by average total assets; FINSLACK is the sum of the ending cash balance at 
the end of the quarter and any financing facilities available deflated by average total assets; CFOO is total 
operating cash outflows less related party payments deflated by average total assets; CFIO cash outflows from 
investing activities less related party loans deflated by average total assets; CHAIR is coded one for firms with 
an independent chairman and zero otherwise; AUDC is coded one for firms with an audit committee and zero 
otherwise; AUD is coded one for firms with a Big-4 auditor and zero otherwise; TOP500 is coded one where a 
firm is in the Top 500 companies on the ASX in the relevant quarter (as measured by market capitalisation) and 
zero otherwise; QTR8 is coded zero where the 4C Report is lodged in the first eight quarters and one otherwise; 
SUCC is coded one where a firm has stopped reporting because it has met the ASX's requirement for positive 
operating cash flows, and zero otherwise; ORIG is coded one for firms which were ASX-listed prior to 
admission as a CTE (i.e. changed activities) and zero otherwise. 
 
†Average total assets is calculated using the relevant half-year balances.
Table 5 
Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients and p-values below the diagonal  
Test 
variables RPP RPL INDIR CHAIR AUDC AUD MCAP TOP500 QTR8 ROA RD FINSLACK CFOO CFIO SUCC ORIG 
RPP 1.0000 0.0253 -0.0314 0.0482 -0.0229 -0.0273 -0.2916 -0.1535 0.0770 -0.2822 0.0891 0.2342 0.1234 0.0305 -0.1222 -0.0260 
  0.1181 0.0518 0.0029 0.1568 0.0919 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0593 0.0000 0.1075 
RPL -0.0710 1.0000 -0.0055 0.0094 0.0030 -0.0072 -0.0106 -0.0118 -0.0355 0.0011 -0.0266 -0.0179 -0.0079 0.0612 -0.0077 -0.0026 
 0.0000  0.7316 0.5621 0.8515 0.6554 0.5124 0.4637 0.0280 0.9446 0.0994 0.2673 0.6236 0.0002 0.6343 0.8729 
INDIR -0.0617 0.0154 1.0000 0.4061 0.2287 0.1218 0.0895 0.0272 -0.0089 0.0128 0.0809 0.1730 0.0583 -0.0062 -0.0094 -0.3168 
 0.0001 0.3416  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0919 0.5814 0.4302 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.7024 0.5591 0.0000 
CHAIR 0.0094 -0.0055 0.3656 1.0000 0.1703 -0.0514 -0.0015 -0.0235 -0.0383 0.0056 0.0375 0.0045 0.1349 0.0053 0.0840 -0.3838 
 0.5631 0.7348 0.0000  0.0000 0.0015 0.9266 0.1469 0.0179 0.7309 0.0205 0.7809 0.0000 0.7452 0.0000 0.0000 
AUDC -0.0643 -0.0071 0.1875 0.1703 1.0000 0.0915 0.1286 0.0786 -0.0401 -0.0127 0.0477 0.0001 0.1052 0.0435 0.1627 -0.0231 
 0.0001 0.6613 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0130 0.4307 0.0032 0.9961 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.1523 
AUD -0.0345 -0.0064 0.1188 -0.0514 0.0915 1.0000 0.2645 0.1725 -0.0142 0.0541 0.0807 0.0987 -0.0893 0.0269 0.1011 -0.0272 
 0.0330 0.6912 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.3813 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0967 0.0000 0.0926 
MCAP -0.3199 0.0047 0.0852 -0.0070 0.1163 0.2574 1.0000 0.6208 -0.0052 0.2033 0.1141 -0.0875 -0.0777 0.0776 0.2446 -0.0698 
 0.0000 0.7734 0.0000 0.6655 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.7465 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TOP500 -0.1883 -0.0182 0.0238 -0.0235 0.0786 0.1725 0.5146 1.0000 -0.0351 0.1390 0.0377 -0.0244 -0.0372 0.0496 0.2036 -0.0487 
 0.0000 0.2593 0.1416 0.1469 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0300 0.0000 0.0197 0.1316 0.0214 0.0021 0.0000 0.0026 
QTR8 0.0846 -0.0607 -0.0078 -0.0383 -0.0401 -0.0142 0.0052 -0.0351 1.0000 0.0083 0.0717 -0.0648 0.1518 -0.0582 -0.1560 0.0425 
 0.0000 0.0002 0.6292 0.0179 0.0130 0.3813 0.7472 0.0300  0.6065 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0086 
ROA -0.3101 0.0116 0.0348 0.0266 0.0356 0.0555 0.2325 0.1556 0.0156 1.0000 -0.1058 -0.1913 -0.1194 0.0483 0.1862 -0.0695 
 0.0000 0.4732 0.0311 0.1002 0.0276 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.3342  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 0.0000 
RD 0.0992 -0.0717 0.1371 0.0017 0.0176 0.0534 0.2433 0.1124 0.0191 -0.1440 1.0000 0.1274 0.0808 -0.0756 -0.0970 -0.0432 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9151 0.2759 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.2383 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0076 
FINSLACK 0.3003 -0.0426 0.1577 -0.0041 -0.0010 0.1225 -0.0500 0.0068 -0.0657 -0.1911 0.1392 1.0000 0.0064 -0.0665 -0.0705 -0.1472 
 0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.8000 0.9529 0.0000 0.0020 0.6755 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.6939 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CFOO 0.1811 -0.0043 0.0278 0.1666 0.1561 -0.0636 -0.0469 -0.0301 0.1509 -0.0901 -0.0555 0.0492 1.0000 -0.0193 0.1022 -0.1047 
 0.0000 0.7900 0.0854 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0037 0.0622 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0023  0.2320 0.0000 0.0000 
CFIO -0.0553 0.0649 -0.0377 0.0016 0.0745 0.0524 0.1834 0.1295 -0.1343 0.0834 -0.1672 -0.0593 0.0892 1.0000 0.0409 -0.0197 
 0.0006 0.0001 0.0196 0.9210 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000  0.0114 0.2231 
SUCC -0.1646 0.0041 -0.0077 0.0840 0.1627 0.1011 0.2233 0.2036 -0.1560 0.2393 -0.1527 -0.0439 0.1356 0.1429 1.0000 -0.1003 
 0.0000 0.8001 0.6359 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
ORIG -0.0331 0.0278 -0.3037 -0.3838 -0.0231 -0.0272 -0.0523 -0.0487 0.0425 -0.0779 -0.0704 -0.1674 -0.1580 -0.0430 -0.1003 1.0000 
 0.0404 0.0858 0.0000 0.0000 0.1523 0.0926 0.0012 0.0026 0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0078 0.0000  
Table 6 
Tobit regressions of related party payments and loans  
Model 1:  
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Model 2:  
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   Model 1 (RPP)    Model 2 (RPL)   
 Pred Coefficient   Coefficient  
Variables sign t-statistic    t-statistic   
Intercept  0.0338   -0.1241  
  7.8700 **  -4.9600 ** 
INDIR - -0.0083   0.0166  
  -1.7900 *  1.2400  
CHAIR - 0.0030   -0.0031  
  1.5400   -0.5600  
AUDC - -0.0009   -0.0030  
  -0.5100   -0.6200  
AUD - 0.0014   -0.0012  
  0.8400   -0.2400  
MCAP - -0.0028   0.0035  
  -7.9700 **  1.4600  
TOP500 - 0.0012   -0.0186  
  0.9300   -1.7100 * 
QTR8 + 0.0025   -0.0168  
  4.2700 **  -3.4600 ** 
ROA - -0.0096   -0.0076  
  -8.2200 **  -0.8700  
RD - 0.0444   -0.5533  
  5.0700 **  -2.7800 ** 
FINSLACK + 0.0111   -0.0213  
  9.4100 **  -2.4800 * 
CFOO - 0.0095     
  5.2200 **    
CFIO -    0.0530 ** 
     3.0300  
SUCC - -0.0037   -0.0057  
  -1.7600 *  -0.8200  
ORIG ? -0.0005   0.0017  
  -0.2400   0.3300  
       
n  3827   3827  
Chi-square  401.47   35.80  
p-value  0.0000    0.0006   
See Table 4 for variable definitions. 
    *  p-value significant < 0.05 (one-tailed) 
   ** p-value significant < 0.01 (one-tailed) 
 
 
